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I. Introduction   Over the past decade, forensic science has become an increasingly important part of the criminal justice system. New and improved technologies—most prominently, but hardly limited to, forensic DNA profiling—have increased the capability of forensic science to contribute to criminal investigations. During the same time, however, forensic science has increasingly been characterized as being in need of reform. Insiders and outsiders alike have called for urgent reforms of forensic science, so much so that some have gone so far as to suggest that forensic science is “under siege” (Pyrek, 2007). The recently published National Academy of Science report on forensic science gives some notion of the nature and degree of the urgency for reform that has arisen around forensic science. It concluded that forensic science suffered from “serious deficiencies” (National Research Council, 2009a). It noted that “Forensic science facilities exhibit a wide variability in capacity, oversight, staffing, certification, and accreditation,” that “Too often they have inadequate educational programs, and they typically lack mandatory and enforceable standards, founded on rigorous research and testing, certification requirements, and accreditation programs,” and that they “lack strong ties to our research universities and national science assets” (National Research Council, 2009b: S‐10)   The controversy over forensic science is wide ranging. And, “forensic science” itself is hardly a unitary concept. Rather, it encompasses a wide variety of disciplines and techniques (National Research Council, 2009b: S‐5). Techniques range from the molecular biological assay of forensic DNA profiling to analysis of shoe prints. Practitioners range from Ph.D. scientists and physicians to police officers assigned to forensic duties. Disciplines range from questioned document examination to forensic entomology. This wide range of practice makes it difficult to generalize about “forensic science” or to generalize about what might be “wrong” with it (National Research Council, 2009b: S‐4). However, an incomplete list of factors that have engendered the current impetus toward reform would surely include funding, scientific infrastructure, links to “mainstream” science, commitment to norms of scientific etiquette, validation, quality control and assurance, bias, institutional location, error, training, basic research, accreditation and certification, incompetent practitioners, and the influence of adversarialism. 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Process % Attribution % Identity % Bolstering % Quantification % 
A 31 17 0.55 13 0.42 3 0.10 7 0.23 4 0.13 
B 43 20 0.47 26 0.60 7 0.16 8 0.19 2 0.05 
C 18 13 0.72 6 0.33 4 0.22 2 0.11 0 0.00 


































Process % Attribution % Identity % Bolstering % Quantification % 
A 31 17 0.55 13 0.42 3 0.10 7 0.23 4 0.13 
B 43 20 0.47 26 0.60 7 0.16 8 0.19 2 0.05 
C 18 13 0.72 6 0.33 4 0.22 2 0.11 0 0.00 
Total 92 50 0.54 45 0.49 14 0.15 17 0.18 6 0.07  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